We exploit the change in U.S. segment reporting rules (from SFAS No. 14 to SFAS No. 131) to examine two motives for managers to conceal segment profits: proprietary costs and agency costs. Managers face proprietary costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns high abnormal profits attracts more competition and, hence, reduces the abnormal profits. Managers face agency costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns low abnormal profits reveals unresolved agency problems and, hence, leads to heightened external monitoring. By comparing a hand-collected sample of restated SFAS No. 131 segments with historical SFAS No. 14 segments, we examine at the segment level whether managers' disclosure decisions are influenced by their proprietary and agency cost motives to conceal segment profits. Specifically, we test two hypotheses: (1) when the proprietary cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively high abnormal profits (hereafter, the proprietary cost motive hypothesis), and (2) when the agency cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively low abnormal profits (hereafter, the agency cost motive hypothesis). Our results are consistent with the agency cost motive hypothesis, whereas we find mixed evidence with regard to the proprietary cost motive hypothesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
T his paper investigates what motivates managers to conceal line-of-business (LOB) information via segment aggregation. Aggregation is a central issue in financial reporting and to some extent is determined by mandated standards. Where a mandated standard exists, however, considerable managerial discretion is often allowed in how the standard is applied. We argue that, with respect to the number of segments firms report, this was the case to a great extent under SFAS No. 14 and is so to a lesser extent under the current SFAS No. 131. 1 We therefore exploit the change to SFAS No. 131 segment reporting to examine two possible motives for discretionary nondisclosure (i.e., aggregation) of segments under SFAS No. 14, namely, proprietary costs and agency costs.
Our investigation of segment reporting contributes to the empirical literature on discretionary disclosure choices. Empirical tests of voluntary disclosure often aim to test the predictions of theoretical models. The traditional motive offered by the literature to explain nondisclosure in general (e.g., Verrecchia 1983 ) and aggregation of segments in particular (e.g., Hayes and Lundholm 1996) is that disclosure reveals proprietary information.
2 This motive is also the one most often put forward by managers. For instance, Ettredge et al. (2002) report that 86 percent of the industrial firms that commented on the Exposure Draft for SFAS No. 131 opposed the new standard on the grounds that ''it would put them at competitive disadvantage.'' It is therefore not surprising that prior empirical studies focus primarily on examining the proprietary costs of segment disclosure (e.g., Harris 1998; Piotroski 2003; Botosan and Stanford 2005) . These papers generally find evidence consistent with disclosure being constrained by proprietary costs.
We argue that much of the prior evidence consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis is also consistent with an alternative ''agency cost'' hypothesis that posits disclosures are withheld as a result of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Nevertheless, prior segment reporting papers do not attempt to directly test whether managerial selfinterest plays a role in segment aggregation decisions. Even in the broader empirical disclosure literature, scant evidence exists on the agency cost motive for withholding disclosure. 3 Segment reporting is potentially fertile ground for examining the impact of agency conflicts on disclosure decisions. Prior research provides evidence that multi-segment firms trade at a discount relative to stand-alone firms (the ''diversification discount'') and that internal capital markets in firms with diversified LOB transfer funds across segments in a suboptimal manner (e.g., Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Lamont 1997; Shin and Stulz 1998) . Moreover, Berger and Hann (2003) find that firms that started reporting multiple segments (as opposed to one segment) when SFAS No. 131 came into effect experienced an increase in their diversification discount in the year of the disclosure change. If greater disclosure more fully reveals the extent of value-destruction at an underperforming firm, then the potential for corporate governance and control mechanisms to discipline the 1 SFAS No. 14 is FASB Statement No. 14, Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise (FASB 1976 Enterprise and Related Information (FASB 1997) . 2 Theory also suggests that under reasonably broad circumstances greater disclosure can result in capital market benefits. Prior research finds evidence consistent with higher disclosure resulting in capital market benefits (see, e.g., Sengupta 1998; Hail and Leuz 2006) . Nevertheless, the evidence that increased disclosure creates a capital market benefit remains controversial (see, e.g., Francis et al. 2006) . 3 One exception is Boehmer and Ljungqvist (2004) , who find that German firms are less likely to go public when controlling shareholders enjoy large private benefits of control. Another exception is Leuz et al. (2006) , who find evidence suggesting that Securities and Exchange Commission deregistrations are often motivated by the desire of controlling insiders to protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny.
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underperforming manager may increase. Consistent with this conjecture, Bens and Monahan (2004) find that within a 17-year U.S. panel, firms with more disclosure experience smaller diversification discounts. These findings together suggest that managers face potential costs from segment disclosures that reveal underperformance associated with agency problems. The primary purpose of this study is to provide evidence on this agency cost impact of disclosure.
In particular, we study managers' proprietary and agency cost motives to hide abnormal segment profits, which we define as a segment's rate of return relative to that of its industry. Given the limited set of items that are disclosed in segment footnotes, we argue that segment profitability is likely the most valuable piece of information managers might wish to withhold from competitors and investors. Managers face proprietary costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns high abnormal profits attracts more competition and, hence, reduces the segment's abnormal profits. On the other hand, managers face agency costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns low abnormal profits reveals unresolved agency problems and ultimately leads to heightened external monitoring. We therefore hypothesize that managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively high (low) abnormal segment profits when the proprietary (agency) cost motive dominates (hereafter, the proprietary (agency) cost motive hypothesis).
We test these two hypotheses using a sample of 796 firms (with 2,310 segments) that report multiple segments based on SFAS No. 131 restated segment reporting for the year prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 131 (hereafter, the lag adoption year). We hand-collect restated SFAS No. 131 data from lag adoption year 10-Ks to compare the segment information reported under the two reporting regimes for the same firm at the same point in time. The restated SFAS No. 131 and historical SFAS No. 14 segment data allow us to identify a set of ''new'' and ''old'' SFAS No. 131 segments and, hence, examine managers' reporting choice at the segment level. The new segments consist of those that were previously aggregated under the old regime, presumably because of the relatively greater discretion afforded under SFAS No. 14 and the desire to obscure the performance of the individual segments, whereas the old segments consist of those that were already reported as separate LOB segments under the old standard. The proprietary (agency) cost motive hypothesis therefore predicts that within the sample of firms in which the proprietary (agency) cost motive dominates, the new segments tend to have higher (lower) abnormal profits than the old segments.
Because the proprietary and agency cost motive hypotheses have opposite predictions about the new and old segments' abnormal profits, we partition our sample into two samples such that one cost consideration is likely to dominate the other and we test each hypothesis separately within each sample. Throughout the study, we refer to the set of firms for which the agency cost motive is likely to dominate as the ''AC motive sample'' and to the set for which the proprietary cost motive is likely to dominate as the ''PC motive sample.'' Then, using a logit regression analysis, we test whether the new segments tend to have higher (lower) abnormal segment profits than the old segments within the AC (PC) motive sample.
Our results are consistent with the agency cost hypothesis. Within the AC motive sample, the new segments are associated with lower abnormal profits than the old segments, suggesting that managers avoid revealing poorly performing segment information when agency costs are the primary motive. We do not find evidence consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. Finally, we perform various sensitivity tests to ensure that our inferences are not affected by measurement error in our abnormal segment profit measures. Our inferences are robust to these sensitivity tests.
Our results make two main contributions to the literature. First, the hand-collected restated SFAS No. 131 segment data allow us to study managers' reporting decisions at the segment level using segment profitability, which is conceptually a more relevant measure of the proprietary or agency costs of segment disclosure than the measures used in prior studies. Specifically, we argue that it is how well a segment performs relative to its industry that managers try to hide. Previous papers assume instead that segment aggregation aims to hide the profitability of the industry that the segment operates in. We view such an assumption as unrealistic because industry-wide information is likely already available to both competitors and the market. Put differently, in studying managers' motives to withhold segment data, one needs to consider not only what managers want to hide, but also what they can hide. If the information is already available to competitors and the market, then there is no proprietary or agency cost of disclosing such information. Conceptually, neither industry profits (Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005) nor firm-level profits (Piotroski 2003) serve to capture the underlying proprietary costs of segment disclosure as they are likely already known by competitors. Therefore, segment profitability is a more relevant measure than those used in prior studies.
Second, prior research (e.g., Harris 1998; Ettredge et al. 2002; Piotroski 2003 ) focuses on examining the proprietary costs of segment disclosure. We extend the segment disclosure literature as well as the broader discretionary disclosure literature by incorporating the agency costs of disclosure in our analysis. Moreover, because the proprietary and agency cost motives to withhold segment information yield opposite predictions for the hidden segments' abnormal profits, our analysis highlights the importance of partitioning the sample by differing motives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature and presents our research hypotheses. Section III details our sample selection and research design. Section IV provides our empirical results and sensitivity tests. Section V concludes.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Several prior studies explore segment reporting as a discretionary disclosure choice. These studies generally find that segment reporting choices are influenced by proprietary costs. Harris (1998) examines the relation between competition and disclosure of industry segments and interprets her findings as evidence that operations in less competitive industries are less likely to be reported as industry segments. Botosan and Harris (2000) examine the determinants of managers' decisions to voluntarily increase segment disclosure frequency and do not find any association with proprietary costs. Botosan and Stanford (2005) interpret their results as evidence that, under SFAS No. 14, managers hide profitable segments operating in less competitive industries. Consistent with this line of research, our first hypothesis predicts that managers face proprietary cost motives to withhold segment data.
The primary purpose of our study is to shed light on a second motive to withhold segment data-namely, the agency cost motive. Recent studies provide evidence that managers may also face agency costs of segment disclosure, which arise when segment data provide information that is indicative of unresolved agency problems. In particular, Berger and Hann (2003) and Sanzhar (2003) examine the impact of more disaggregated segment disclosure under SFAS No. 131 and find that the more disaggregated reporting under SFAS No. 131 creates a greater diversification discount. These findings are suggestive of managers concealing information about agency problems under SFAS No. 14, although they are also Segment data are of particular importance for revealing agency concerns because they provide information about a company's diversification strategy and its transfers of resources across divisions. Prior research finds evidence consistent with internal capital markets in conglomerates transferring funds across segments in a suboptimal manner (Berger and Ofek 1995; Lamont 1997; Shin and Stulz 1998; Rajan et al. 2000) . Several studies indicate that diversified firms trade at a discount relative to stand-alone firms (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995) and that the diversification discount is associated with measures of agency problems (Denis et al. 1997; Berger and Ofek 1999) . 5 Managers may therefore use their discretion opportunistically to conceal negative segment information. Accordingly, our second hypothesis predicts that managers face agency cost motives to withhold segment data.
We focus on managers' proprietary and agency cost motives to hide abnormal segment profits, which we define as the segment's rate of return relative to that of its industry. The reasons we focus on segment profitability are as follows. First, as noted before, managers' number-one stated concern about greater segment disclosure is competitive harm (Ettredge et al. 2002) ; managers are ultimately concerned that the loss of competitive advantage and increased competition from potential entrants would lead to lower abnormal profits. Second, in a typical segment footnote, there are five key line items: sales, assets, earnings, capital expenditures, and depreciation. Earnings (deflated by segment sales or assets) is probably the most relevant measure in assessing the segment's performance. Finally, Berger and Hann (2003) provide descriptive evidence that while LOB revenues are often available in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of a company's 10-K, earnings figures are generally found only in segment disclosures. 6 Hence, hiding segment profits (as opposed to hiding segment revenues or industry profits) is likely the dominant motive for managers to aggregate segment information.
From the proprietary cost perspective, when a segment earns an abnormal profit relative to its industry peers, competitors may follow its business/marketing strategies or enter the specific product markets (within that industry) that the segment operates in. Hence, managers potentially have a proprietary cost motive to withhold segments with relatively high abnormal profits. This prediction is theoretically ambiguous, however, because some models of voluntary disclosure are consistent with disclosure increasing rather than decreasing when concerns about competitors are greater (see, e.g., Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Newman and Sansing 1993; Gigler 1994) . From the agency cost perspective, the presence of a poorly performing segment may reflect underlying unresolved agency problems associated with excess diversification or inefficient cross-segment transfers. Separately reporting such a segment may result in heightened external scrutiny. Thus, managers have agency cost motives to withhold segments with relatively low abnormal profits. Because the proprietary and agency cost motives yield opposite predictions on the abnormal profits of withheld segments, it is important that we test these predictions within a sample of firms for which one cost consideration dominates the other. Hence, we formally state the proprietary and agency cost motive hypotheses as follows: 
H1-Proprietary

III. SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY Sample Selection and Data
Our initial sample includes firms listed on Compustat's Annual Industrial, Research, and Full Coverage files, the CRSP monthly returns file, and the I/B/E/S detail database with minimum sales of $20 million and industry segment data available on Compustat's industry segment file. 7 To isolate the effect of SFAS No. 131 from real changes (such as acquisitions and divestitures), we hand-collect restated segment data from a company's first SFAS No. 131 10-K. This allows us to directly compare the historical SFAS No. 14 and the restated SFAS No. 131 segment data for the fiscal year prior to the adoption year (i.e., the lag adoption year) under the old and the new reporting regimes (see Figure 1 for a timeline detailing the data collection). The sample selection procedures used in this study closely follow those reported in Berger and Hann (2003) (hereafter, BH) . We therefore provide only a summary of our sample selection in this section.
8 Our final sample includes 2,310 SFAS No. 131 segments, comprising 796 firms that report as multi-segment firms under SFAS No. 131 in the lag adoption year. We include only SFAS No. 131 multi-segment firms in our sample because our research question pertains to managers' decisions to aggregate segment data, and this disclosure decision is moot for ''true'' single-segment firms.
The Accounting Review, July 2007 Original segment data for fiscal year Ϫ1 (the lag adoption year) based on SFAS No. 14: Compustat segment data from the last SFAS No. 14 10-K (released on FD tϭϪ1 ). The adoption year is the first year companies adopted SFAS No. 131. For most firms, the adoption year is 1998. FYE ϭ fiscal year-end; FD ϭ 10-K filing date.
We are interested only in the LOB segment-reporting choice for two reasons. First, a primary objective of SFAS No. 131 is to improve LOB segment disclosures by reducing the flexibility afforded under the industry approach. Second, prior research argues that it is LOB (and not geographic) diversification that is associated with agency problems. Our focus on LOB segment disclosure is also consistent with most prior studies of segment disclosure. To isolate LOB disclosures, we have to disentangle the geographic from the LOB segments. Under SFAS No. 14, industry LOB and geographic segment disclosures are separately reported and, hence, it is easy to identify LOB segments under the old regime. Under SFAS No. 131, while internal operating segments are most commonly defined based on the segment's LOB, they are sometimes defined based on geographic area. To ensure a fair comparison between the restated SFAS No. 131 segments and the historical SFAS No. 14 LOB segments and to avoid overstating the number of new LOB operating segments, we follow the same procedure described in BH to aggregate the operating segments that are defined based on geographic area. Also, following the algorithm employed by BH, we eliminate all observations that are ''contaminated,'' that is, for which the restated data partially reflect other changes at the firm in the adoption year (e.g., pooling acquisitions, discontinued operations, or changes from LIFO to other inventory accounting methods), to ensure that our restated segment data capture only reporting changes related to the adoption of SFAS No. 131. Further, we eliminate all firm observations for which the sum of segment sales deviates from firm-level sales by more than 5 percent.
To obtain our measure of abnormal (industry-adjusted) segment profit, we rely on the SIC codes assigned by Compustat to classify segments under both SFAS No. 14 and SFAS No. 131. The assignment of the SIC codes may seem more questionable under the new standard (segments are defined by the firm's internal operating system) than under the old standard (LOB segments were delineated along industry lines). We therefore conduct a validity test to check whether it is equally appropriate to use the SIC code classification of segments under both reporting regimes. Our results, discussed in detail in Appendix A, suggest that it is as appropriate to classify our SFAS No. 131 segments by the SIC code as it is for the SFAS No. 14 segments. Finally, all variables in our main analysis are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Methodology and Research Design SFAS No. 131 Segments: New versus Old Segments
A major concern with SFAS No. 14 was that discretion with respect to a segment's industry definition allowed managers to report more aggregated segment information to external users than what was reported internally (Ernst & Young 1998 14 segments. If a match is found, then the segment is coded as an old segment; otherwise it is coded as a new segment (see Example 1 in Appendix B). We then manually examine all segments in our sample to identify any potential miscoding from Compustat. We focus on the matching of two items, namely, segment names and segment sales, in this second step. For any segment with identical segment names and sales under the two regimes, we code it as an old segment. In some cases, the segment names are identical under the two standards, but the restated sales figure is slightly different from the original SFAS No. 14 sales figure. There are also cases in which the restated and original segments have slightly different names (but share the same SIC code) and sales figures under the two regimes, but the information content is essentially the same across the two sources. In these two scenarios, we generally code the segment as an old segment (see Example 2 in Appendix B). For any firms that reported as a single-segment firm under SFAS No. 14 and became a multi-segment firm under SFAS No. 131, all SFAS No. 131 segments are by definition new segments.
Our approach is subject to caveats as a result of the following two maintained assumptions: (1) managers have relatively less discretion about the extent of segment aggregation under the new standard, and (2) the increased disclosure under the new standard reflects discretionary aggregation under the old standard. To the extent that these assumptions are not true, our segment classification-and, hence, our inferences-will be affected. With respect to the first assumption, we emphasize that our maintained assumption is that there is less discretion under SFAS No. 131 in one dimension of segment reporting-the number of reported segments. We recognize that the new standard still allows substantial
The Accounting Review, July 2007 discretion about some other aspects of segment reporting, such as the extent of allocation across segments. It is therefore possible that our results might be affected if managers strategically allocate expenses within each firm. For instance, if the AC (PC) motive to withhold segment information dominates, managers might have an incentive to allocate less (more) expenses to the segments with relatively low (high) abnormal profits. However, such strategic allocation would work against finding the hypothesized results.
Managers may also continue to have substantial discretion over reportable segments under SFAS No. 131 because firms can presumably restructure their ''internal operating segments'' to avoid reporting more disaggregated data. If the cost of internal restructuring is sufficiently low, then managers with incentives to conceal segment information will still be able to aggregate segment data under the new regime. In that case, either we would not find a significant increase in segment disclosure under the new standard, or the increased reporting would not fully reflect discretionary aggregation under the old standard. The reliance on our maintained assumptions is a limitation of our research design. We nevertheless view our maintained assumptions as reasonable and offer the following arguments to support them.
First, Street et al. (2000) find that very little internal restructuring occurs after SFAS No. 131. Specifically, only six of the 160 firms in their sample realign their organizational structure after SFAS No. 131. This result suggests that while it is feasible to reorganize internally to withhold segment information under the management approach, few companies appear to exploit this flexibility. Second, the new standard was largely the result of extensive lobbying by analysts (Association for Investment Management and Research [AIMR] 1993). From our conversations with the FASB project manager on the new standard, it appears that one of the main concerns of analysts was that ''the old standard seemed to offer unlimited discretion,'' primarily because of the ample flexibility inherent in the definition of what an industry segment is.
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While the new standard does not completely preclude managers from discretionary aggregation, it is arguably subject to less discretion on segment aggregation compared to the old standard. Further, several studies (Street et al. 2000; Herrmann and Thomas 2000; Berger and Hann 2003) document that the number of reported segments under SFAS No. 131 increased significantly relative to SFAS No. 14. More importantly, the reporting change is overwhelmingly one-sided, with very few firms decreasing the number of reported segments. In other words, there was a significant increase in segment disaggregation when SFAS No. 131 was implemented. We acknowledge that the documented increase in segment reporting could merely indicate a neutral application of the old and the new standards. This would occur if the typical firm's internal segmentation for management decision purposes generally presents a finer partitioning than does an attempt to provide all relevant disaggregation under the industry approach. To the extent this is true, our inferences will be affected. However, if the reporting change reflects only managers' neutral compliance with the two reporting standards, then it should work against finding the hypothesized results.
Disentangling the Agency and Proprietary Cost Motives
As discussed previously, because the proprietary and agency cost motive hypotheses have opposite predictions about the new and old segments' abnormal profits, it is important to partition our sample into two samples such that one motive is likely to dominate the other and then test each hypothesis separately within each sample. Accordingly, we split our sample into: (1) an agency cost (AC) motive sample (firms for which the AC motive likely dominates), and (2) a proprietary cost (PC) motive sample (firms for which the PC motive likely dominates). We partition the full sample as follows. First, we assume that absent agency problems managers act in the best interests of shareholders and would only choose to withhold segment information if the proprietary costs of disclosure outweighed the capital market benefits of disclosure. Thus, our PC motive sample includes all firms for which the agency cost motive to withhold segment profits is not present. In contrast, when the agency cost motive is present, managers do not act in the best interests of shareholders, so when the agency cost motive is present, we presume that it represents the dominant motive. Thus, our AC motive sample includes all firms for which the agency cost motive to withhold segment information is likely to be present.
Two clarifications regarding the partitioning into AC and PC motive samples are worth noting. First, the purpose of our study is not to compare segment profits across the PC and AC samples. In particular, we do not hypothesize and, hence, we do not test whether the segments in the PC sample have higher abnormal profits than those in the AC sample. Such a test would be tautological given our sample partitioning. Rather, the purpose of the sample partitioning is to test the PC and AC hypotheses within each sample by comparing segment profits across the new and the old segments.
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Second, our sample partitioning at the firm level is aimed at identifying a subset of firms (i.e., an AC motive sample) for which the agency cost motive is present and, hence, is likely to be the dominant motive. Not every segment in the AC motive sample has low abnormal profitability. If that were the case (i.e., if we constructed an AC sample such that all segments have low profitability), we would have relatively little variation in the variable being tested. Thus, our research design is aimed at testing whether the new segments tend to have lower abnormal profits than the old segments within the AC motive sample.
To identify a sample of firms for which the AC motive likely dominates, we rely on prior literature, which finds evidence of a diversification discount and suboptimal crosssegment transfers. Specifically, in the context of segment disclosure, we argue that managers of firms with inefficient cross-segment transfers likely face agency cost motives to withhold segment data. Our first step in constructing the AC motive sample is to use an approach similar to that of Billett and Mauer (2003) and Berger and Hann (2003) to construct a measure of transfers (TRANSFER) by comparing a segment's capital expenditures to its own cash flow. The intuition behind the construction of this measure is as follows. If a segment's free cash flow is not sufficient to cover its investments, then some investments are being subsidized by a combination of the following: other segments, excess operating cash flow of the segment in question in prior years, and the external capital market. Using the level of capital expenditures (CAPX) as a proxy for investment and the sum of operating profits and depreciation as a proxy for free cash flow, we first compute excess CAPX (i.e.,
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12 All measures are constructed using restated SFAS No. 131 data for the lag adoption year. We then compare excess CAPX at the segment level with excess CAPX at the firm level to control for investments that are funded out of either prior years' retained cash flow or external financing. The difference between the segment's excess CAPX and the firm-level excess CAPX thus captures the extent of transfers from other segments.
Note that our measure of transfers does not indicate whether the shift of funds between segments is value-decreasing and, hence, attributable to agency problems. To incorporate into our measure an assessment of whether the cross-segment funds transmissions are inefficient, we follow Billett and Mauer (2003) and assume that a segment that underperforms relative to the remaining segments of the firm is an ''inefficient'' segment. Therefore, we classify a firm as having inefficient cross-segment transfers (i.e., the AC motive sample) if it has at least one segment that has both positive TRANSFER and a return on sales (ROS) that is less than the weighted average ROS of the remaining segments in the firm. All other firms are included in the PC motive sample.
Model of Managers' Segment Reporting Choice: PC versus AC Motives
We examine managers' segment reporting decisions by estimating various versions of the following logit regression at the segment level: (1)
The dependent variable, NEW, is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 (0) if the segment is a new (old) SFAS No. 131 segment. The main variable of interest is I ROS, our measure of abnormal profits, which we define and discuss in detail in the following subsection. Note that we do not include I ROS as a separate independent variable in the pooled regression model because we test the PC and AC motive hypotheses separately within the AC and PC motive samples. Specifically, recall that the PC (AC) motive hypothesis predicts that the new segments tend to have higher (lower) abnormal profits than the old segments within the PC (AC) motive sample. In other words, the PC and AC motive hypotheses have opposite predictions on the association between NEW and I ROS-the PC motive hypothesis predicts a positive association, and the AC motive hypothesis predicts a negative association.
One way to allow the relation between NEW and I ROS to vary across the two conflicting motives is to estimate logit regressions separately for the PC and AC motive samples. Such an approach, however, would allow not only the coefficient of I ROS, but also the coefficients of the other independent variables to vary across the two motives. Because we do not predict that the relation between NEW and the other independent variables would vary across the PC and AC samples, we opt for a second approach. We estimate a pooled regression with two interaction terms, I ROS * PC and I ROS * AC, which allows us to test the relation between NEW and I ROS separately within each sample. The AC (PC) indicator takes a value of 1 if the segment is in the AC (PC) motive sample, and 0 otherwise. The PC motive hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on the first interaction term, I ROS * PC (i.e., ␤ 2 Ͼ 0). The AC motive hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient on the second interaction term, I ROS * AC (i.e., ␤ 3 Ͻ 0).
In the following subsections, we define and discuss the construction of the abnormal segment profit measures and the control variables. All independent variables are constructed using restated SFAS No. 131 segment data for the lag adoption year.
Abnormal Segment Profits
We use industry-adjusted return on sales (I ROS) as our primary measure of abnormal segment profits. An issue with using segment profitability ratios arises from the allocation of total sales and total assets to each segment. Sales are usually completely allocated among the reported segments of multi-segment firms, whereas assets are not. The magnitude of these unallocated assets is sufficiently large that it can distort inferences. For example, Berger and Ofek (1995) report that segments appear to have a somewhat smaller median book value of assets than stand-alone firms due solely to the incomplete allocation of assets to segments by multi-segment firms. Because sales are much more likely than assets to be fully allocated to a firm's segments, we use industry-adjusted ROS instead of ROA. Moreover, we eliminate all firms for which the sum of segment sales deviates from the firmlevel figure by more than 5 percent. In our final sample, 99 percent of the segments have a deviation of less than 1 percent.
We recognize that industry-adjusted ROS captures segment profit margins rather than total segment profitability (i.e., it ignores asset turnover). By industry-adjusting, however, we reduce the likelihood of our ROS measure having a low correlation with ROA because the negative correlation between total asset turnover and ROS is smaller within industries than across industries. We confirm that the intra-industry correlation between ROS and ROA is relatively high, finding in untabulated tests that the mean (median) correlation between them for the stand-alone firms in our sample industries is 0.58 (0.59). Nevertheless, the sensitivity tests near the end of the paper include a test that replaces industry-adjusted ROS with industry-adjusted ROA as our measure of abnormal segment profitability.
I ROS is measured at the segment level and the industry adjustment is based on the segment's primary SIC code, where an industry is defined based on the narrowest SIC grouping that includes at least five firms. While our research design allows us to study managers' reporting decisions at the segment level, we are faced with the limitation of a profit measure that is subject to measurement error because SFAS No. 131 does not prescribe a specific segment profit definition-it allows any (GAAP or non-GAAP) measure used internally for decision making to be reported as the segment profit. As a result, firms do not always use the same definition of segment profits, which complicates profit comparisons across firms.
To investigate the extent of this problem in our sample, we manually examine segment footnotes in an attempt to explore the feasibility of identifying a sample within which the segment profit definition is consistent. Identifying the segment profit definition, however, proves to be difficult because some firms do not clearly state their profit definition in their segment footnotes. For instance, some companies use generic terms like ''segment profits'' or ''operating income,'' which mean different things at different firms. For these companies, we can only identify the profit definition used at the segment level if the firm provides a reconciliation of the sum of its segment profits to a specific firm-level income definition (e.g., pre-tax income or net income). Therefore, in addition to reading segment footnotes, we compare the sum of segment profits to various definitions of profit at the firm level (which we obtain from Compustat) and we label the difference between the two as the ''profit deviation.'' We find that most firms use one of only a few formal profit definitions. However, the items that are allocated or not allocated to the segments (e.g., depreciation expense, amortization expense, SG&A, interest expense, interest income, special items, etc.) are quite diverse, which results in a multitude of effective profit definitions used in our sample. To address this problem, we first provide some descriptive statistics on the reported segment profit definitions for our sample. We then discuss the mechanism we use to adjust the reported segment profits to allow for a fair comparison across firms. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the segment profit definitions for our sample firms. The reported definitions are either taken directly from the segment footnote from the adoption year 10-K or derived indirectly by comparing the sum of segment profits to total firm profits. We use the latter method to identify the segment profit definition only when a definition results in the difference between the sum of segment profits and total firm profits being equal to zero. We classify each firm into one of the following six profit definitions: (1) EBIT: earnings before interest and taxes, (2) PTI: pre-tax income, (3) EBITDA: earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, (4) IBEI: income before extraordinary items, (5) NI: net income, and (6) GP: gross profit. For the firms for which we cannot identify the segment profit definition (8 percent), we classify them in an ''Other'' category.
We note that there are still some variations within the six profit definitions because certain items such as special charges are sometimes included or excluded within each definition. The most widely reported definition is EBIT (58 percent), followed by PTI (18 percent). The other definitions are relatively sparsely employed. 13 The distribution of profit definitions at the segment level, reported in the far right column, is essentially the same as that at the firm level. While most firms (87 percent) report only one segment profit definition, 11 percent of the sample report two definitions, and less than 2 percent report more than two definitions. For firms with more than one segment profit definition, we code the firm's profit definition as the first of the definitions it uses from the following ordered set (in order of frequency used): EBIT, PTI, EBITDA, IBEI, NI, and GP. In other words, each firm is assigned only one profit definition.
Given that EBIT and PTI are the most widely used profit definitions at the segment level, we conduct our empirical analysis with both measures to ensure that our results are robust to using either definition. More importantly, to achieve comparability across firms, we create two corresponding ''adjusted'' segment profit measures by grossing the reported segment profits up or down by a portion of the deviation between the sum of segment profits and firm-level EBIT or PTI. The portion of the total profit deviation allocated to a segment is equal to the ratio of the segment's sales to the sum of segment sales. We refer to the deviation between the sum of segment profits and firm-level profits as the ''profit deviation.'' Our measures of abnormal segment profits, I ROS EBIT Adjusted and I ROS PTI Adjusted , are calculated using the corresponding ''adjusted'' segment profits.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the Pearson correlations between the two sets of industryadjusted segment profits, one calculated using the reported segment profits and the other using the adjusted segment profits. The correlations between the reported and adjusted I ROS for both EBIT and PTI are quite high, ranging from 0.96 to 0.99, which suggests that the cross-sectional variation in segment profits is driven primarily by ''core'' operating earnings (i.e., the part of earnings that is unaffected by the set of items such as depreciation Panel A reports the distribution of segment profit definitions for the full sample, at both the firm and segment levels. The full sample includes 796 firms that report as multi-segment firms under SFAS No. 131 in the lag adoption year. See Figure 1 for the definition of lag adoption year. Certain items such as special charges are sometimes included or excluded within each of the first six profit definitions (i.e., EBIT, PTI, EBITDA, IBEI, NI, and GP); hence, there are some variations within each category. The ''Other'' category includes all observations for which we cannot identify the segment profit definition. For firms with more than one profit definition, we code the firm's profit definition as the first of the definitions it uses from the following ordered set (in order of frequency used): EBIT, PTI, EBITDA, IBEI, NI, and GP. Each firm is therefore assigned only one profit definition.
(continued on next page)
The Accounting Review, July 2007 and amortization expense that may be allocated or unallocated at the segment level). Put differently, the cross-sectional variation in core operating earnings dominates the crosssectional variation in the deviation.
While our measure of abnormal profits is subject to potential measurement error, it has several advantages over the profit measures used in prior studies. I ROS is a direct measure of segment profits that captures how well a segment performs relative to its industry peers. Other measures of segment profitability such as the speed of profit adjustment used in Harris (1998) generally reflect industry profitability characteristics, which are not hidden. Publicly available industry information is likely of secondary importance in managers' reporting decisions compared with a direct measure of the segment's performance. Prior studies (e.g., Piotroski 2003; Botosan and Stanford 2005 ) have also used firm-level abnormal profits to capture potential proprietary costs. Firm-level profit measures have less measurement error because they are based on GAAP definitions and are not affected by withinfirm allocations. On the other hand, it is segment profits rather than firm-level profits that managers may try to hide via aggregation. Our measure of segment profits is therefore a more relevant measure for studying discretionary disclosure, although this enhanced relevance carries with it the problem of potential measurement error.
Control Variables
Prior studies on segment disclosure (e.g., Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005 ) use measures of industry competition to proxy for proprietary costs of disclosure. We therefore include two widely used measures to control for industry competition: HERF and PROFITADJ. HERF, the Herfindahl index, is widely used as a measure of industry concentration and competition. We first compute the industry measure of HERF as follows:
where: s ij ϭ business i's sales (segment i's sales for segments of multi-segment firms and firm i's sales for single-segment firms) in industry j, as defined by two-digit SIC code; S j ϭ the sum of sales for all businesses (including segments of multi-segment firms) in industry j; s ij /S j ϭ business i's market share; and n ϭ the number of businesses in industry j.
The greater IHERF j , the higher (lower) the current level of industry concentration (competition) for industry j. We then match the industry measure to each segment by two-digit SIC code to obtain an estimate of the segment's industry concentration ratio.
PROFITADJ is an industry abnormal profit adjustment measure constructed based on Harris (1998) . It is intended to capture the speed with which abnormal profits are driven down to a normal rate of return. In particular, we estimate the persistence of abnormal profits for each industry using the following industry-pooled, cross-sectional, time-series regression over the 1985 to 1997 period:
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where:
X ijt ϭ the year t difference between firm i's ROA and the mean ROA for its two-digit industry, j; D n ϭ an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if X ijtϪ1 is less than or equal to 0, and 0 otherwise; and D p ϭ an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if X ijtϪ1 is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.
The coefficient estimate of D p X ijtϪ1 (i.e., ␤ 2j ) is used to measure the speed of adjustment for positive abnormal ROA in industry j, with greater ␤ 2j indicating a slower rate of abnormal profit adjustment. We then assign the industry measure to each segment by twodigit SIC code to obtain the industry abnormal profit adjustment rate applicable to each segment.
To ensure that PROFITADJ is not merely capturing each segment's industry earnings persistence, we include an additional control variable, I PERS, which measures the segment's earnings persistence. I PERS is constructed in a similar manner to PROFITADJ. We first estimate the following industry-pooled, cross-sectional, time-series regression over the 1985 to 1997 period:
X ijt ϭ year t difference between firm i's ROA and the mean ROA for its two-digit industry, j.
The coefficient estimate of lagged ROA (␤ 1j ) is a measure of the persistence of abnormal earnings within industry j. We then match the industry measure to each segment by twodigit SIC code to obtain an estimate of the segment's persistence of abnormal earnings.
In addition, we control for another important segment attribute that may affect managers' reporting decisions, namely, growth opportunities. Piotroski (2003) finds that firms with higher growth opportunities are associated with lower reporting fineness at the firm level, suggesting that growth opportunities may capture proprietary costs of segment disclosure. We therefore include I PE, a measure of segment growth opportunities, as a control variable. Because price-earnings (PE) ratios are not available at the segment level, we use the median PE ratio of the industry in which a segment operates as a proxy for the segment's PE ratio. Specifically, I PE is computed based on the narrowest SIC grouping that includes at least five firms.
We include five additional control variables in the model: the level of pre-SFAS No. 131 industry aggregation (INDAGG), the segment's size relative to the firm (RELSIZE), segment diversity (SEGDIVERSITY), firm size (FSIZE), and firm growth opportunities (MKTBK). INDAGG captures the degree of industry aggregation prior to SFAS No. 131. Multi-segment firms may be more likely to aggregate their segment data to hide profit information if their segments operate in industries in which a large portion of their multisegment peers are also aggregating. To construct the measure of pre-SFAS No. 131 industry aggregation, we first compute the proportion of sales from single-segment firms to total industry sales before and after SFAS No. 131 (i.e., in 1997 and , where we define an industry by two-digit SIC code. The time-series of this measure of single-segment industry share (PUREPLAY) is of interest. In particular, we find in unreported analysis that PUREPLAY is relatively stable in the periods before and after SFAS No. 131. In the three years prior to SFAS No. 131 (i.e., 1995 -1997 , the average (median) PUREPLAY across all industries ranges between 45-47 percent (43-45 percent). In 1998, after the enactment of SFAS No. 131, the average (median) PUREPLAY decreases to 32 percent (26 percent) and stays at about that level in the two years thereafter. The significant drop in PUREPLAY in 1998 is consistent with a large number of pre-SFAS No. 131 single-segment firms switching to multiple-segment reporting after SFAS No. 131 (as documented in prior studies). Put differently, the industries with the biggest drop in PUREPLAY after SFAS No. 131 are industries with a larger proportion of multi-segment firms that were aggregating (reporting as single-segment firms) under SFAS No. 14. We therefore use the magnitude of the decrease in PUREPLAY in 1998 as a measure of pre-SFAS No. 131 industry aggregation (i.e., INDAGG ϭ PUREPLAY 97 Ϫ PUREPLAY 98 ). After computing INDAGG for each industry, we match it to each segment by two-digit SIC code to obtain a measure of the pre-SFAS No. 131 extent of aggregation in the segment's industry.
The next two control variables, RELSIZE and SEGDIVERSITY, capture the firm's ability to report aggregated segment information under the old reporting rule. RELSIZE is the ratio of segment sales to firm sales. If the main goal of segment aggregation is to hide information about abnormal profitability, aggregating small segments with larger ones will make it difficult to infer the abnormal profitability of the small segment. SEGDIVERSITY is a measure of diversity. Under SFAS No. 14, firms with operations in similar industries were afforded greater discretion to aggregate segment information than those with operations in diverse industries. We measure segment diversity as the ratio of the number of unique twodigit SIC codes across segments to the total number of restated SFAS No. 131 segments. Finally, we control for firm size and for growth opportunities, as proxied by the market-tobook ratio.
Profit Deviation: 10 Percent, 5 Percent, and 2 Percent Deviation Samples
Because companies report different profit definitions at the segment level under SFAS No. 131, we adjust the reported (restated) segment profits by grossing them up or down by their share of the profit deviation (i.e., the deviation between the sum of segment profits and firm-level profits). Each segment's share of the profit deviation is equal to the ratio of the segment's sales to the sum of segment sales for all the firm's segments. While the profit adjustment provides a uniform profit definition across the sample, it can introduce measurement error in the abnormal segment profit measures, especially when the profit deviation is large. We therefore conduct the logistic regression analyses on three samples: 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples. The 5 percent deviation sample, for instance, includes the firms for which the absolute profit deviation is less than 5 percent of the sum of segment sales. The 10 percent and 2 percent deviation samples are constructed analogously. The trade-off between using a higher cutoff versus a lower cutoff is the extent of the measurement error versus the sample size. With the 10 percent sample, we retain a large portion of the full sample (87 percent), but the measurement error on segment profits at some firms can be quite large. On the other hand, with the 2 percent sample, the average deviation is relatively small, but the sample size is substantially smaller (33 percent of the full sample). The 5 percent sample is probably the best sample for the purpose of our analysis. With the 5 percent sample, we are able to retain much of the original sample (67 percent of the full sample) and the extent of profit deviation is still within a reasonable range. Given these trade-offs, however, we report regression results from all three samples in Section IV.
The Accounting Review, July 2007 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the sample's segment profit deviations separately for the full sample and the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples for the lag adoption year. The full sample includes 2,310 restated SFAS No. 131 segments, comprising 796 firms that report as multi-segment firms under SFAS No. 131 in the lag adoption year. The 10 percent deviation sample excludes from the full sample any firms for which the absolute EBIT and PTI deviations are more than 10 percent of total segment sales. The 5 percent and 2 percent deviation samples are constructed similarly. Segment profit adjustment is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the adjusted segment earnings (EBIT ADJUSTED or PTI ADJUSTED ) and the reported segment earnings (EBIT REPORTED or PTI REPORTED ), deflated by segment sales. EBIT ADJUSTED (PTI ADJUSTED ) are computed by grossing EBIT REPORTED (PTI REPORTED ) up or down by the firm EBIT (PTI) deviation based on segment sales, where the EBIT (PTI) deviation is defined as the difference between the sum of segment profits and firm-level EBIT (PTI). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the magnitude of profit adjustment for the full sample and the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples, alternately using EBIT and PTI. Specifically, we define a profit adjustment as the absolute value of the difference between the adjusted and reported segment profits, deflated by segment sales. For the full sample, the profit deviation appears to be economically significant for at least a subset of the sample-the average EBIT (PTI) profit adjustment is 3.9 percent (4.9 percent). When we turn to the 10 percent deviation sample, the average EBIT and PTI adjustments are both lower by about 2 percent, and only one-quarter of the sample's EBIT (PTI) adjustments are above 2.4 percent (4.0 percent). As expected, the profit deviation becomes even smaller for the 5 percent and 2 percent deviation samples, especially for the 2 percent deviation sample. The profit adjustment and, hence, any potential measurement error arising from the adjustment, is unlikely to be economically significant in these samples. 14 segment disclosures in the lag adoption year. The 10 percent deviation sample excludes from the full sample any firms for which the absolute EBIT and PTI deviations are more than 10 percent of total segment sales. The 5 percent and 2 percent deviation samples are constructed similarly. EBIT (PTI) deviation is defined as the difference between the sum of segment profits and the firm-level EBIT (PTI). All measures reported in Table 3 are averages calculated over the three years prior to the adoption year.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
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are presented separately for firms with at least one new segment, firms without any new segments, and for all firms. The differences in means across the two subgroups are also presented in a separate column. For the full sample and the three deviation samples, the distributions across the two subgroups are very similar-roughly 55 percent of the firms have at least one new segment and 45 percent have no new segments. The descriptive statistics from Table 3 suggest that firms with at least one new segment are not significantly different from firms without any new segments in terms of firm size (as measured by total assets, total sales, and market capitalization), the market-to-book ratio, and operating performance (as measured by return on assets and return on sales). This observation holds within the full sample and the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples.
We also compare these firm characteristics across the full sample and the three deviation samples. None of the profit deviation cutoffs appears to create a sample-selection bias. Casual observation suggests that the firms in the three deviation samples are comparable to those in the full sample for most attributes. Statistical tests (not tabulated) confirm this observation. While the 2 percent deviation sample appears to be smaller in size than the full sample, its average total assets, total sales, and market capitalization are not significantly different from those of the full sample. (This holds across the three columns: all firms, firms with new segments, and firms without new segments).
Panel A of Table 4 reports the distribution of new and old segments for the full sample and the three deviation samples. Of the 2,310 segments in the full sample, 50 percent are newly revealed under SFAS No. 131 and 50 percent are already reported under SFAS No. 14. Similarly, the new and old segments are relatively evenly distributed in the three deviation samples, suggesting that the profit deviation cutoff does not create a bias in the distribution of new and old segments.
Panel B of Table 4 provides the distribution of segments across the AC and PC motive samples, separately for the full sample and the three deviation samples. Because we perform all empirical analysis using two profit definitions, EBIT and PTI, we have two different AC/PC partitions, one corresponding to each of the two profit definitions. As with the distribution of new and old segments, the distribution of the AC/PC partitions is very similar across the full and the three deviation samples. We therefore focus our discussion on the full sample.
Recall that our measure of transfers (TRANSFER) is affected by the segment's operating cash flow (see Section III), which we approximate by adding back depreciation to either EBIT or PTI. The AC/PC partition therefore varies with the profit definition. In particular, a lower income number makes it more likely that a segment's CAPX will exceed the proxy for the segment's operating cash flow and, hence, that a larger portion of the segments will be classified into the AC motive sample. For instance, when we partition the sample based on EBIT, 37 percent (63 percent) of the full sample's segments are classified into the AC (PC) motive sample. When we use PTI, which is always less than or equal to EBIT, 44 percent (56 percent) of the full sample's segments are classified into the AC (PC) motive sample, yielding a slightly more even distribution across the two groups. Table 5 reports the results of the univariate analysis on managers' segment-reporting decisions for the three deviation samples. For both the univariate and multivariate analysis, the results for the full sample are qualitatively and statistically similar to those for the 10 percent deviation sample. We therefore do not report the full sample results. Recall that the AC (PC) motive hypothesis predicts that the new segments have lower (higher) abnormal
Univariate Analysis
The Accounting Review, July 2007 A segment is classified as inefficient if its ROS is less than the weighted average ROS of the remaining segments in the firm. The PC motive sample includes all other observations. All segment-level measures are constructed using restated SFAS No. 131 segment data for the lag adoption year.
segment profits than the old segments within the AC (PC) motive sample. Univariate results for the AC (PC) motive hypothesis are reported in the left (right) panel. Within each panel, we report the abnormal segment profits (alternatively defined using EBIT and PTI) for the new and old segments, along with their differences. We also report the number of observations and the sample distribution in the table. Overall, the sample segments are relatively evenly distributed across the new and old segments for both the AC and PC motive samples. This observation holds for all three deviation samples and for both profit definitions.
For the AC motive sample, the results are qualitatively and statistically similar across the three deviation samples and the two profit definitions. In all cases, the new segments earn significantly lower average abnormal profits than the old segments (ranging from 10 percent lower in the 10 percent deviation sample to 18 percent lower in the 2 percent deviation sample), consistent with managers aggregating the poorly performing segments when the agency cost motive dominates. For the PC motive sample, the results are weaker. While the new segments' abnormal profits are significantly higher than those of the old segments in the 10 percent deviation sample, the abnormal profit differences across the new and the old segments are not different from zero at p Ͻ 0.10 level in either the 5 percent or 2 percent deviation samples. Thus, at best, the results from the univariate analysis are weakly consistent with the PC motive hypothesis. Of course, the univariate analysis does not control for factors other than profitability that may affect segment aggregation. These additional variables are incorporated in the multivariate analysis that follows.
Multivariate Logit Regression Analysis
Panels A and B of Table 6 present the results from the multivariate logistic regression analysis (i.e., estimation of Equation (1)) using EBIT and PTI. The results for the three deviation samples are presented in the left, middle, and right portions of each panel. Within each deviation sample, the first two columns report the coefficient estimates and their pvalues and the third column reports the corresponding change in probability. Because we include multiple firm observations in our regression analysis, the p-values are generated using robust (Huber-White) standard errors that correct for firm clustering. The probability change columns measure the change in the probability of the segment being new given a one-standard deviation change in the independent variable; it is calculated as the product of the variable's marginal effect and its standard deviation.
14 The main variables of interest 
*, **, *** Statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed test), respectively. The 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples and the AC and PC motive samples are defined in Table 4 . All abnormal segment profit measures are defined in Table 1 . *, **, *** Statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed test), respectively. p-values are generated using robust (Huber-White) standard errors that correct for firm clustering. Panels A and B report the regression results of the following logit model for the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples (as defined in Table 4 
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The dependent variable, NEW, is an indicator variable with the value of 1 (0) if the segment is a new (an old) segment. A segment is classified as a new segment if it was not reported as a separate line-of-business segment under SFAS No. 14 in the lag adoption year. A segment is classified as an old segment if it was reported as a separate line-of-business segment both in the restated SFAS No. 131 and historical SFAS No. 14 segment disclosures in the lag adoption year. Definitions of Independent Variables: AC EBIT / PTI ϭ an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if the segment is included in the AC (PC) motive sample; see Table 4 for the definition of AC and PC motive samples; I ROS EBIT ADJUSTED ϭ industry-adjusted segment ROS EBIT ADJUSTED ; ROS EBIT ADJUSTED is segment ROS calculated using the adjusted segment profit measure, EBIT ADJUSTED ; EBIT ADJUSTED is computed by allocating any deviation between the sum of segment profits and firm-level EBIT to each segment's EBIT REPORTED based on segment sales; I ROS PTI ADJUSTED ϭ industry-adjusted segment ROS PTI ADJUSTED ; ROS PTI ADJUSTED is segment ROS calculated using the adjusted segment profit measure, PTI ADJUSTED ; PTI ADJSUTED is computed by allocating any deviation between the sum of segment profits and firm-level PTI to each segment's PTI REPORTED based on segment sales; HERF ϭ the Herfindahl index of the segment's corresponding two-digit industry concentration; PROFITADJ ϭ an estimate of the speed of abnormal profit adjustment for the segment's corresponding industry, where industry is defined based on two-digit SIC code; the higher the PROFITADJ, the lower the speed of profit adjustment; see Section III for a detailed discussion of the construction of this variable; I PE ϭ the P / E ratio of the segment's corresponding industry; industry is defined by the narrowest SIC code with at least five firms; I PERS ϭ an estimate of earnings persistence for the segment's corresponding industry, where industry is defined based on two-digit SIC code; see Section III for a detailed discussion of the construction of this variable; INDAGG ϭ the level of pre-SFAS No. 131 industry aggregation for the segment's corresponding industry, where industry is defined based on two-digit SIC code; see Section III for a detailed discussion of the construction of this variable; RELSIZE ϭ the ratio of segment sales to firm sales; SEGDIVERSITY ϭ the ratio of the number of unique SIC codes across segments to the total number of restated SFAS No. 131 segments;
FSIZE ϭ the average of the log of the firm's total assets over the three years prior to the adoption year; and MKTBK ϭ the average ratio of the firm's market value of equity to book value of equity over the three year prior to the adoption year. All segment-level variables are constructed using restated SFAS No. 131 segment data for the lag adoption year. The ''Probability Change'' measures the change in the probability of the segment being a newly reported segment upon adoption of SFAS No. 131, given a standard deviation change in the independent variables (x i ). It is calculated as the product of the marginal effect and the standard deviation of x i . The marginal effects are equal to ⌳(␤x)([1 Ϫ (␤x)]␤ i , where ⌳ is the logistic cumulative distribution and ␤ i is the coefficient estimate of x i . The marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. The Pseudo R 2 is computed as:
where L r and L are the log-likelihood functions evaluated at the restricted (slopes ϭ 0) and unrestricted estimates, respectively. are the interaction terms between I ROS and the AC and PC indicator variables. The AC motive hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient on I ROS * AC, whereas the PC motive hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on I ROS * PC.
Before we turn to the tests of the main hypotheses, the results for two of the control variables are worth noting. First, we find a positive and generally statistically significant coefficient estimate on PROFITADJ. The p-value on this coefficient estimate is never better than 0.20 in the 2 percent deviation sample, however, which might be a result of the substantial drop in sample size for this sample. The overall finding on PROFITADJ, consistent with Harris (1998) , suggests that managers tend to withhold the segments that operate in industries in which the firms with above-average profitability maintain their profitability advantage longer. This finding is interpreted by Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) as being consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. The basis for this interpretation is the view that the industry is less competitive (and thus proprietary information is more valuable) if the top-performing firms in the industry have maintained their advantage longer.
However, this finding is subject to an alternative interpretation. In particular, the slow convergence of the top performers toward the industry mean performance can be driven by the weaker firms continuing to experience unresolved agency problems (as opposed to the top firms having a competitive advantage via withholding proprietary information). Ex ante, it is unclear which interpretation dominates. We therefore interpret the positive estimates on PROFITADJ in Table 6 as being consistent with the new segments having been aggregated under SFAS No. 14 for either agency cost or proprietary cost reasons.
Another control variable, SEGDIVERSITY, has coefficient estimates that are consistently significant at p Ͻ 0.01 in the predicted direction. This result suggests that the degree of segment diversity is an important factor that affects the firm's ability to aggregate under the old reporting standard. This finding is perhaps unsurprising, as we expect firms with operations in diverse industries to be less able to aggregate their segment information than firms with operations in similar industries under the old industry-based reporting regime.
Turning to our primary tests, results from the logistic regression analysis are consistent with the AC hypothesis. In particular, the coefficient on I ROS * AC is negative and significant at p Ͻ 0.05 level in all three deviation samples using either profit definition. For instance, for the 5 percent (2 percent) deviation sample with PTI (results reported in Panel B), the coefficient on I ROS * AC is Ϫ0.49 (Ϫ0.62) and it is significant at p Ͻ 0.01 (p Ͻ 0.05). The Ϫ0.04 (Ϫ0.06) reported under the probability change column indicates that a one-standard deviation decrease in abnormal profits would increase the probability of a segment being aggregated under the old reporting standard by 4 percent (6 percent) within the AC motive sample. In short, the results suggest that when the agency cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments that have poor abnormal profits, consistent with managers using their discretion opportunistically to conceal negative information under the old standard.
The results for the test of the PC hypothesis are less consistent. The coefficient on I ROS * PC is positive in all cases, but it is not always statistically significant at p Ͻ 0.10. When segment profits are defined using EBIT, the p-values of the coefficient of I ROS * PC ranges from 0.11 in the 10 percent deviation sample to 0.51 in the 5 percent deviation sample. When segment profits are defined using PTI, the results are stronger, with the pvalues for I ROS * PC ranging from 0.01 in the 10 percent deviation sample to 0.25 in the 5 percent deviation sample. Overall, we do not find robust results consistent with the PC motive hypothesis.
The weak results for the PC motive hypothesis may seem surprising given that prior studies interpret their results as evidence that proprietary costs are associated with less segment disaggregation (i.e., Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005 ). Harris's (1998) main finding is that PROFITADJ is positively associated with segment aggregation. As discussed above, this finding appears to be as consistent with our AC motive hypothesis for segment aggregation as it is with the PC motive hypothesis.
The two main inferences Botosan and Stanford (2005) (hereafter, BS) draw with regard to proprietary costs are that hidden segments operate in less competitive industries than the hiding firm's primary industry and that the hidden segments make the hiding firms (falsely) appear to be underperforming their competitors. While both inferences are consistent with the PC hypothesis, we discuss below why they are questionable.
BS conduct their competitive environment tests on a sample of change firms that report multiple segments under SFAS No. 131, but only one segment under SFAS No. 14. They find that the median difference between a change firm's industry concentration ratio and the weighted average of the concentration ratios of its segments' industries is significantly negative, but that the mean difference is insignificantly different from zero. Ignoring the insignificant mean difference in drawing their inference is one factor that brings into question BS's conclusion that segment disclosure is lower among less competitive industries. A more important concern is that, unlike their profitability analysis, BS's competitive environment analysis makes no attempt to benchmark the results for the change firm sample against control samples of firms that did not change their segment reporting upon adoption of SFAS No. 131. Thus, it is not clear whether even the median concentration ratio result documented for the change firms is different from what one would find for multi-segment firms that did not change their number of reported segments when adopting SFAS No. 131.
The inference from BS's profitability analysis that the hidden segments make the hiding firms (falsely) appear to be underperforming their competitors is questionable for several reasons. First, BS's tests do not directly measure the profitability of hidden segments. Instead, they make their inference indirectly by measuring ''unexpected'' profit for the change firms based on the difference between a change firm's reported profit and the profit of its industry. This procedure is valid only if the industry profit is an accurate proxy for the change firm's expected profit in the absence of any strategic reporting behavior. The industry profit is alternately measured by a matched firm (matched to the change firm based on three-digit SIC code and sales) or by a no-change comparison group consisting of firms that report only one segment both before and after SFAS No. 131.
Second, BS do not find consistent results across their empirical analyses. BS's inference that the hidden segments made the hiding firms falsely appear to be underperforming arises only from the analysis of medians using the matched firm comparison group. When basing expected profits on matched firms, BS find that the change firms' median unexpected profits are significantly negative when using the firm-based expected profits and insignificant when using the segment-based expected profits. BS interpret the difference between the firmbased and segment-based results as attributable to the firm-based proxy for expected profits being observable in real time, whereas the segment-based proxy uses restated segment data that would not have been observable in real time. Thus, the fact that the expected profit proxy is smaller using the segment-based estimate is attributed by BS to firms choosing, under SFAS No. 14, to hide segments from relatively profitable industries. BS do not explain, however, why they fail to obtain similar results from the analysis of means using the matched firm comparison group or from the analyses of means and medians using the no-change comparison group. Third, any differences between the firm-and segment-based results may be due to differences in measurement error rather than to differences in what was observable in real time. The segment-based approach first calculates the expected profits of the segments of the change firm and then adds the segments' expected profits together to arrive at the change firm's expected profit. This creates a problem because, for some firms, the sum of segment sales is less than firm sales. BS only eliminate such firms from their sample when the deviation exceeds 10 percent. Because they do not assign the unallocated firm sales to the segments, the segment-based expected (unexpected) profit figure is systematically biased downward (upward). This bias works in the direction of the finding that BS use to make their inference.
Fourth, because only univariate profitability analysis is performed, the BS tests implicitly assume that profitability is the only factor that affects whether a segment is hidden under SFAS No. 14. As our paper shows, however, other factors such as segment size, segment diversity, and firm size also affect the probability of hiding a segment. Failing to include these additional variables in a multivariate analysis may affect the inferences that BS draw about the impact of profitability.
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To provide further assurance that the differences between our inferences and those of Harris (1998) and BS are likely attributable to differences in research design and measures of proprietary costs (as discussed above), we explore whether our weak proprietary cost results are driven by our sample partitioning. We note that the results on the PC hypothesis are generally stronger when we use PTI instead of EBIT. Such a difference could arise because of differing measurement error embedded in the alternatively defined abnormal profit measures, and/or different sample partitions. The latter difference arises because our measure of transfers is a function of the segment's operating profits. Recall that when we partition the sample based on EBIT, 37 percent (63 percent) of the full sample segments are classified in the AC (PC) motive sample. When we use PTI, 44 percent (56 percent) of the full sample segments are classified in the AC (PC) motive sample.
One possible explanation for the weaker EBIT results on the PC hypothesis is that using EBIT as a definition of operating profits might overstate free cash flow and, hence, understate excess CAPX, which consequently leads to misclassifying some observations as PC motive firms when they should be classified as AC motive firms. To shed light on this issue, we perform a logit regression analysis similar to those reported in Table 6 , but using the PTI AC/PC motive partition in conjunction with using I ROS EBIT as the abnormal profit measure. Results (not tabulated) are significantly stronger for the PC motive hypothesis-the coefficients on I ROS EBIT * PC are positive and significant at p Ͻ 0.05 in all three deviation samples (the coefficient on I ROS EBIT * AC remains consistently negative and significant at p Ͻ 0.05 in all three deviation samples). These results are consistent with potential misclassification of AC motive firms in the PC motive sample driving the weak results on the PC hypothesis. Nevertheless, the PC results are not robust to some of the sensitivity tests discussed in the next subsection. We therefore interpret our results as being mixed with regard to the proprietary cost hypothesis.
Sensitivity Tests
As discussed previously, a limitation of exploiting SFAS No. 131 data is that segment profits are not defined in a consistent manner across firms. We therefore perform a battery of analyses in the previous section and a sensitivity test in this section to demonstrate that measurement error resulting from differences in segment profit definitions across firms is not driving our results. In addition, we perform several sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are robust to using a firm-adjusted (as opposed to industry-adjusted) abnormal segment profit measure, an industry-adjusted ROA (as opposed to industry-adjusted ROS) abnormal segment profit measure, an alternative AC/PC sample partitioning scheme, and an alternative set of deviation samples constructed using earnings (as opposed to sales) as the scaling factor.
Randomly Adjusted Abnormal Segment Profits
To provide additional evidence that our inferences on the agency cost hypothesis are not affected by measurement error arising from the profit adjustment, we perform a sensitivity test on the 5 percent deviation sample using a ''randomly adjusted'' segment profit measure. Specifically, the randomly adjusted measure is computed by artificially adding a noise term, ␦, to each segment's ROS REPORTED , where ␦ is uniformly distributed over [Ϫ0.05, 0.05] to account for the full range of possible profit deviations in the 5 percent deviation sample. We then compute industry-adjusted abnormal segment profits using this alterative adjusted segment profit measure. Results from the logit regression analysis using this alternative abnormal segment profit measure, reported in Table 7 , are qualitatively and statistically similar to the original results (reported in Table 6 ) for the 5 percent deviation sample (for both EBIT and PTI). In particular, the coefficient on I ROS * AC remains negative and significant at p Ͻ 0.05. This sensitivity test indicates that the earlier results consistent with the AC hypothesis are unlikely to be attributable to measurement error arising from the profit adjustment.
Alternative Measure of Abnormal Segment Profits: Firm-Adjusted Abnormal Segment Profits
In our empirical analysis, we use industry-adjusted ROS as a proxy for abnormal profits to test both the agency and proprietary cost hypotheses. Conceptually, an industry benchmark is relevant in the context of proprietary costs because it captures how well the segment performs relative to its industry peers. However, in the context of agency costs, industryadjusted profits may not be the best measure of abnormal profits. For instance, a segment that underperforms relative to its industry may be the best-performing segment in the firm if the other segments also fall behind their industry peers. An alternative measure is a firmadjusted measure that captures how well the segment performs relative to the firm's remaining segments. We conduct a sensitivity test using a measure of firm-adjusted ROS (F ROS), which is calculated as the difference between the segment's ROS and the weighted average of the remaining segments' ROS. The industry-and firm-adjusted ROS measures are highly correlated, with the (untabulated) Pearson correlation coefficient between these measures being 0.83 for EBIT and 0.81 for PTI. Not surprisingly, the (untabulated) results are qualitatively and statistically similar to those reported in Table 6 in all samples, indicating that our inferences are robust to using this alternative measure of abnormal segment profitability. *, **, *** Statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed test), respectively. p-values are generated using robust (Huber-White) standard errors that correct for firm clustering. Table 7 reports the regression results of various versions of the following Logit model for the 5 percent deviation sample (as defined in Table 4) :
The dependent variable, NEW, is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 (0) Table 4 for the definition of AC and PC motive samples. All other independent variables are defined in Table 6 . The ''Probability Change'' measures the change in the probability of the segment being a newly reported segment upon adoption of SFAS No. 131, given a standard deviation change in the independent variables (x i ). It is calculated as the product of the marginal effect and the standard deviation of x i . The marginal effects are equal to ⌳(␤x)([1 Ϫ ⌳(␤x)]␤ i , where ⌳ is the logistic cumulative distribution and ␤ i is the coefficient estimate of x i . The marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. The Pseudo R 2 is computed as:
where L r and L are the log-likelihood functions evaluated at the restricted (slopes ϭ 0) and unrestricted estimates, respectively.
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Alternative Measure of Abnormal Segment Profits: Industry-Adjusted ROA We also conduct a sensitivity test using industry-adjusted ROA (instead of ROS) as a proxy for abnormal segment profits. To address the fact that firm assets are often not fully allocated to the firm's segments, we follow the approach adopted by Berger and Ofek (1995) . First, we exclude all observations for which the sum of the segment assets deviates from the firm's total assets by more than 25 percent. For those observations for which the asset deviation is less than 25 percent, we allocate the deviation proportionately to each segment based on the ratio of the segment's assets to the sum of segment assets. We then construct 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent asset-deflated deviation samples where the cutoff is calculated by deflating the profit deviation by the sum of segment assets. While the sample size is smaller in the asset-deflated deviation samples, the (untabulated) results for the main logit regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6 . In particular, the coefficient estimates of the AC interaction term are negative and significant at either p Ͻ 0.10 or p Ͻ 0.05, with two exceptions: the coefficient estimates become marginally insignificant in the 5 percent EBIT deviation sample (p ϭ 0.13) and in the 2 percent PTI deviation sample (p ϭ 0.11). The coefficient estimates of the PC interaction terms in all deviation samples (for both EBIT and PTI) are never significantly different from zero at p Ͻ 0.10.
Alternative AC/PC Motive Sample Partition
Recall that our sample partition includes all firms with at least one inefficient segment with positive TRANSFER in the AC motive sample; all other firms are included in the PC motive sample. This scheme imposes a relatively high threshold for the AC partition. In particular, while the firms in the AC motive sample likely have inefficient cross-segment transfers associated with unresolved agency problems and, hence, have an agency motive to withhold segment information, the firms in the PC motive sample may not be entirely free of the agency cost motive. As a sensitivity test, we relax the inefficient segment requirement and include all firms with at least one segment with positive TRANSFER in the AC motive sample. This alternative sample partition yields a relatively even distribution across the two samples. Results from the logit regression analysis based on this alternative sample partition (not tabulated) are qualitatively and statistically similar to those reported in Table 6 .
Alternative Deviation Samples: Deflated by Earnings
Recall that the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent deviation samples are constructed by using the ratio of the profit deviation to the sum of segment sales as a cutoff. The advantage of using sales instead of earnings as a deflator is that it avoids having negative denominators. However, it might leave room for large profit deviations even in the 5 percent and 2 percent samples. In particular, the median deviation as a percentage of EBIT (PTI) ranges from 8 percent (17 percent) in the 5 percent sample to 4 percent (8 percent) in the 2 percent sample.
To provide some assurance that our inferences are not driven by the large error observations, we perform additional sensitivity tests on our main regression analysis. In particular, we perform the main logit regression analysis (Equation (1)) on three earnings-deflated (as opposed to sales-deflated) deviation samples: 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent. The 10 percent sample includes only firms for which: (1) the sum of segment profits is positive, and (2) the difference between the sum of segment profits and total firm profits is less than 10 percent of total segment earnings. The 5 percent and 2 percent samples are constructed similarly. As expected, the sample sizes for the earnings-deflated deviation samples are substantially smaller-each sample is roughly half as large as the corresponding salesdeflated deviation sample.
Note that while we construct the samples using earnings-deflated deviation thresholds (i.e., 10 percent, 5 percent, and 2 percent) to alleviate the large error concern, we continue to allocate the deviation based on segment sales (instead of segment profits) for two reasons. First, to properly and fully allocate the total deviation, we require not only a positive denominator but also a positive numerator for each segment. If we further exclude any firms that have one or more segments with negative profits (i.e., negative numerators), we would lose a prohibitively large portion of the sample. Second, the agency cost hypothesis tests whether the poorly performing segments are more likely to be hidden; excluding all the firms with negative earnings segments would yield a very low power test.
While the sample size of the three earnings deviation samples is substantially smaller, the results are generally qualitatively and statistically similar to those reported in Table 6 . In particular, the (untabulated) coefficient estimates on the AC interaction term are negative and significant at p Ͻ 0.10 in both the PTI and EBIT regressions for all three deviation samples with one exception-the coefficient estimate is marginally insignificant (p ϭ 0.105) in the EBIT regression for the 2 percent sample. The untabulated coefficient estimates on the PC interaction term are insignificant (positive and significant at p Ͻ 0.10) in the EBIT (PTI) regressions for all three deviation samples. Overall, our inferences are robust to using the earnings-deflated deviation samples.
V. CONCLUSION
This study examines whether managers' decisions to withhold segment information under SFAS No. 14 are influenced by their agency cost as well as proprietary cost motives to conceal segment profits. We hypothesize that when the proprietary (agency) cost motive dominates, managers tend to withhold the segments with relatively high (low) abnormal profits. We test these hypotheses by comparing a hand-collected sample of restated SFAS No. 131 segments with the historical SFAS No. 14 segments. The mandated change setting allows us to identify a set of ''new'' and ''old'' SFAS No. 131 segments and, hence, examine managers' reporting choices at the segment level. Our results are consistent with the agency cost hypothesis. In particular, we find that the new segments tend to have lower abnormal profits than the old segments when the agency cost motive dominates, suggesting that managers exploited the discretion afforded under SFAS No. 14 to opportunistically conceal negative information. Our results are mixed with regard to the proprietary cost hypothesis.
We believe the change from an industry approach to a management approach for segment reporting provides an excellent opportunity to study the motives behind the discretionary aggregation of segments under the industry approach. As part of its convergence project with the FASB, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has issued an exposure draft that proposes changing its segment reporting standard from the current industry approach (similar to SFAS No. 14) to a management approach that would be very similar to SFAS No. 131. Such a change (currently scheduled to take effect in 2009) would allow for a rich extension of the approach in this paper to a broad set of countries with considerable variation in disclosure practices and, presumably, in the proprietary and agency costs of discretionary disclosure choices.
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APPENDIX A VALIDITY OF INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION UNDER SFAS NO. 14 VERSUS SFAS NO. 131
To test whether it is equally appropriate to use the SIC code classification of segments under both reporting regimes, we conduct the following test. We first compute the correlations between the sales (earnings) of segments and the sales (earnings) of their corresponding industry, where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC code. Correlations for stand-alone firms are computed in a similar manner. We compute these correlations under both SFAS No. 14 and SFAS No. 131 (with geographic segments aggregated based on the mechanism described above), using a procedure similar to that in Givoly et al. (1999) .
We include in each industry all businesses that are either stand-alone companies or segments of multi-segment firms. For each business, an industry index is formed by averaging (equally weighted and value-weighted by entity sales) the performance measure (i.e., sales or earnings) across all other entities in the industry. We then compute the time-series correlation of each business with its industry index, first based on the SFAS No. 14 segment definitions (pre-SFAS No. 131 period) and then using the SFAS No. 131 definitions (post-SFAS No. 131 period). We restrict both the pre-SFAS No. 131 and post-SFAS No. 131 analyses to firms with three consecutive years of observations. To assess the quality of the SIC code classification of segments, we compare the average of the correlations of the segments operating in an industry with those of the stand-alone firms, before and after SFAS No. 131. We denote these two sets of correlations as Corr Segment and Corr Firm .
Although we are primarily interested in the segment correlations under SFAS No. 14 and SFAS No. 131, we use the correlations of the stand-alone firms as a benchmark to control for any potential time trend. For each performance measure, we report two sets of correlations-one with the equal-weighted industry index and the other with the valueweighted index. We believe that value-weighting is preferable, especially under SFAS No. 131. Under the new standard, there are more small segments and there is greater withinfirm divergence in segment size.
The results, reported in Table A1 , show that there is no difference between the two segment reporting regimes in the appropriateness of using SIC codes to classify segments. With the exception of the sales correlations constructed with the equal-weighted industry index, Corr Segment is insignificantly different under the two reporting regimes. Although the difference across the two standards in the equal-weighted sales version of Corr Segment is negative and significant (Ϫ0.193), the corresponding difference for the stand-alone firms (Ϫ0.201) is almost identical. Thus, the significant decline in this version of Corr Segment is unlikely to be driven by the new segment reporting standard.
These findings indicate that it is just as appropriate to classify our SFAS No. 131 segments by SIC code as it is for the SFAS No. 14 segments. We believe there are two reasons for this finding. First, after performing our aggregation of the SFAS No. 131 geographic operating segments, SFAS No. 131 data become more industry-oriented. Moreover, our findings (and prior complaints about SFAS No. 14 LOB reporting) are consistent with SFAS No. 14 being less reflective of industry information than it may have appeared to be. *, **, *** Statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, (two-tailed test), respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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In computing the industry indexes, we include in each industry all businesses that are either stand-alone companies or segments of multi-segment firms. For each business, an industry index is formed by averaging (equal-weighted or value-weighted by entity sales) the performance measure (i.e., sales or earnings) across all other entities in the industry. CORR Firm ϭ average correlation of sales (earnings) of stand-alone firms with their respective industries; and CORR Segment ϭ average correlation of sales (earnings) of segments (of multi-segment firms) with their respective industries.
APPENDIX B
We use the following two examples to illustrate our classification of new and old segments.
Example 1: American Home Products
For American Home Products, one of the four SFAS No. 131 segment SIDs is also reported in the original SFAS No. 14 data (Agricultural Products with SID ϭ 8); we therefore code this segment as an old segment. The other three segments (SID ϭ 9, 10, 11) are coded as new segments as they were aggregated into one segment, ''Health Care Products,'' under SFAS No. 14. 
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